Lessons Learned from North Babil

Civil Affairs and the QDR: Opportunity and Challenge

by Mr. Howard Van Vranken

Reprint of article -- see http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/bulletin/volume2issue4/LLQDR.cfm

April 2010

As we consider how to sharpen our focus on peace keeping and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, we naturally consider what lessons can be applied from a generally successful "surge" in Iraq. As a career State Department Foreign Service Officer who served as the Team Leader of an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in North Babil January, 2008 - January, 2009, I have reflected on some of the lessons learned in Iraq and provide some observations about our organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the various cultures of disparate agencies in stability operations in Iraq and identify areas of overlap and barriers to efficacy. Its intended audience is the senior level civil affairs practitioner.

Overview of the Mission and Environment

When I arrived in January, 2008, north Babil was the epitome of a conflict zone. The Iraqi Police and Army were still finding their feet and many of the local units lacked the confidence of the US Army, their civilian leadership, and the population. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni insurgents were present and active, but their activities had curtailed significantly thanks in large part to the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program, our 'surge' troops, and years of counterinsurgency efforts. Shia insurgents, primarily the Jaish al Mahdi (JAM), were increasingly active and had successfully infiltrated local government and security services. The province was still reeling from the murder a month earlier of the Provincial Police Chief, GEN Qais Al Mamori, an able patriot and friend of the US intent on implementing non-sectarian rule of law in the province.

Our area of Iraq was about the size of Rhode Island, and COIN was in full swing. The three battalions of 4BCT/3ID were deeply and intimately engaged in a broad array of projects all with the common aim of alleviating the considerable and evident consequences of the conflict while building the capacity of the Iraqi government. Clearly, the emphasis was on helping Iraqis; CERP was generously used to help farmers, small businesses, schools, and clinics restore operations. The SOI program was well under way, with more than 5,000 paid participants.

Taking advantage of the disruption of insurgent activities, Civil Affairs Teams were working closely with local officials on priority projects, largely focused on health, education and essential services. Everyone complained about the lack of electricity; north Babil was one of the few places in Iraq that suffered periodic cholera outbreaks thanks to critical shortages of potable water. Â International efforts to rebuild infrastructure were restarting as USAID-funded programs rebuilt several schools with more construction planned for the worst affected areas. Internally displaced people, often refugees who had abandoned villages to live in small towns or cities 20 miles away, were anxious to return and rebuild.

Militarily, the brigade had cleared a final AQI stronghold in the Khidr, an agricultural village hugging the Euphrates. Several dozen fighters were killed and about as many were dispersed in a fight that killed one soldier. The area had been cleared only days before I arrived and it was one of the first places I visited. Escorted by LTC Tim Newsome, Commander of the Cottonbalers (3/7 infantry battalion), we walked through a devastated village of bombed out shops, houses, and mosques before meeting the local leader, Sheikh Jaffer. Speaking with Jaffer, I learned that Khidr was a largely Shia village in a region primarily populated by Sunnis. However, until about 2006, sectarian problems were unknown and people of both sects mixed openly and without hostility. Khidr included a small Shia shrine commemorating a beloved religious leader. Sunni fighters, chased out of Baghdad thanks to coalition military operations in 2006, had taken over the village, terrorized the Shia population, destroyed the shrine, and used the area as a base to conduct attacks on Sunnis resident in nearby Iskandariya, Mahmoudiah, and Jurf al Sukr. They pillaged explosives from the nearby remains of the Qaqaa weapons complex.

Khidr was illustrative of the challenges confronting us in north Babil. The population was divided and sectarian wounds were deep and fresh. The Iraqi Army and Police did not exercise, consistent, effective control over the area. The humanitarian needs were staggering; housing, health care, potable water, and food were all in desperately short supply. The economy was in tatters and infrastructure had been destroyed or suffered from years of neglect. Importantly, several insurgent leaders had communicated their willingness to lay down their weapons in exchange for a position in the SOI.

The brigade was well-equipped to address the considerable challenge it confronted, both in terms of resources and leadership. While working in a tremendously dangerous atmosphere, the recently arrived soldiers of 4BCT enthusiastically sought opportunities to engage the population. I had expected Civil Affairs to be at near the bottom of a long list of operational priorities; in fact, it became evident in my first days with the brigade that Civil Affairs and EPRT work was a foremost concern of commanders, behind only the safety and wellbeing of troops. As the brigade commander, COL Tom James, introduced me to his senior leaders, I quickly understood the commitment to COIN exemplified by COL James and his deputy, LTC Roger Shuck.

What we lacked, however, was a clear master plan for moving forward. Stated simply, we had not thought about how we wanted the area to look in a year, two years, or how to get there. Our focus was almost exclusively on generating goodwill among civilians and disrupting those who would do us harm. We also lacked experience in Civil Affairs operations, beyond distributing humanitarian or relief supplies. Perhaps most importantly, we did not have well-established relationships with local leaders.

The Vanguard Brigade arrived about a month before me in Iraq. Their leaders—officers and NCOs—were focused professionals, most with experience in Iraq. They had learned hard lessons working with Iraqi counterparts during previous tours and were determined to apply those lessons in North Babil.

The mission was clear: we had to secure the population in order to give civilian rebuilding efforts an opportunity to gain momentum and return the population to normal activities. We had to build the capability of the local security forces and mentor their development in order for them to regain the confidence of the local population. Any former insurgents willing to forego armed activities and return to civilian life would be welcomed back to their homes and watched carefully. Once the areas were secure, we had to expedite the restoration of essential services and convince the Iraqi government to direct resources to an area still widely considered an insurgent stronghold. Without the balance of security and civilian activities, we would end the 'surge' having failed: if we created security without building civilian activities, security would collapse upon our departure. Civilian activities conducted in an insecure environment were bound to fail as insurgents and gangsters terrorized the people.

Mars and Venus: Building Effective US Civilian-Military Relations on the Battlefield

Much has been written about differences between the corporate cultures of the uniformed military and diplomatic agencies (State, USAID, etc) and much of it is accurate. The military and civilians approach the same problems with identical goals from diametrically opposed viewpoints. That proved the case in north Babil, and we constantly worked to overcome these institutional hindrances. Among the most striking differences in approach were:

Timeframe - We joked that while the military thought of changes that could be made before the next daily Battle Update Brief to the division leadership, USAID thought about how its activities would impact the next generation of Iraqis! While an exaggeration, it nonetheless illustrated the significant gulf in focus between the civilian agencies and our military colleagues.

Resources - The military brings to the battlefield tremendous resources—primarily money and people. During my time in north Babil, we rarely considered how to curtail spending and almost never sought to economize for the sake of economy. That was a stark departure from my nearly two decades with the Department of State which had been a constant exercise in the sensitivity of cost; economy was an ever-present priority. While ePRT operations were less constrained thanks in large part to the Department of State's Quick Response Fund, the instinctive reaction of State and USAID officers is to seek a cheaper, sustainable solution whenever possible. Whereas the military's bottom line was accomplishment of the immediate objective, civilian leadership focused on expense, sustainability and transition. Both sides came to incorporate more balanced thinking, but it was a constant effort to curb our respective institutional predispositions.

In terms of people, the military enjoys a significant advantage in the breadth of expertise in its ranks. In addition to recognized specialists, including such seeming anomalies as lawyers, veterinarians, and police officers, the reserves include a richly diverse group of professionals able to apply their civilian expertise. Though sometimes not deployed as intelligently as we might expect, compared with the Army, the civilian agencies lack that depth of diversity and expertise. Simply stated, we are diplomats and administrators, with occasional experience in another field.

Planning - Among the most striking aspects of the brigade was the investment it made in developing plans and considering how to achieve the commander's intent. When considering what to do and how to do it, the brigade's deliberative planning process was a phenomenally powerful asset for decision makers. The time, energy and creativity invested in the process meant that we were rarely surprised and never at a loss for tactical flexibility. Â Coming from an agency where plans are developed in a process sometimes neglected and frequently ridiculed, I quickly came to recognize the value of the brigade's planning.

Accommodating Diverse Institutional Cultures

Working together required accommodating each cultures' strengths and taking into consideration our institutional needs and imperatives. For example, the Army places an understandable emphasis on unity of effort. In the 3ID, that was highlighted by the singing, every morning with enthusiasm, of the division's song, "The Dog Face Soldier". Each morning, before the update, the entire brigade leadership stood at attention and sang, with vigor, the fight song. While it seemed a bit strange at the beginning, I soon understood the value of participating in terms of unit cohesion. When I become known as the Dog Face Diplomat, I knew the EPRT had been accepted.

There were other ways to accommodate the military that I found my counterparts at other ePRTs did not employ, to their detriment. I made absolutely sure that whenever we were asked to participate in a briefing, meeting, presentation, or discussion, our people participated with enthusiasm, were prepared, and took it seriously. The brigade leadership soon recognized that they did not need to ask the ePRT for something twice; when we had issues of substance or style, we made sure to raise them in advance in an appropriately discreet fashion. That helped make the brigade look good, and assuaged any concerns amount[?] our Army colleagues that we were somehow not team players.

Looking out for the interests of our counterparts was a key element in building cohesion and confidence. In working with our Iraqi counterparts, we developed a system to reinforce each others messages and priorities. That helped the Iraqis understand our goals and assured that they could not play us off against each other. Whenever I briefed General officers about the work of the brigade or the ePRT, I always found someone to praise. If we had problems with someone, we never raised those issues outside the brigade. That helped build credibility with the leadership and facilitated good working relations. Occasionally it required us to stifle our concerns when we honestly disagreed with a course of action, but the sacrifice merited the achievement of team cohesion.



The Army tends to attack problems directly and with overwhelming force and action. Civilians on the ePRT, I found, tended to take a more considered approach, preferring to discuss issues in depth, often repeatedly in different forums before deciding whether we should act. Once we determined that action was merited, we spoke at length about how best to proceed. That kind of deliberative decision-making, characterized by consensus decisions, drove the brigade crazy at times. Our approach meant we measured several times before cutting the fabric.



Our military counterparts, however, appreciated that once we had decided on a way forward, we could move quickly to apply intelligent solutions to difficult problems. One team member in particular, USAID's Michael Maxey, was a resource rainmaker able to expertly pull the levers of bureaucracy to deliver informed solutions to vexing problems. Several thousand refugees need to return to Khidr and rebuild their homes? Michael arranged for an Iraqi firm to distribute building supplies to the home sites. Need back-to-school supplies for schools? Ten thousand backpacks filled with paper, pencils and crayons were delivered to schools courtesy of Michael. Need specialist advice about resuscitating fish farms in the Euphrates valley, Michael arranged for an aquaculture expert to meet the farmers, prescribe a solution and distribute fingerlings to restore 600 family fish farms. Our civilians' ability to effect positive, intelligent results was a key to establishing credibility between agencies.

The Importance of Personnel and Training

While our confidence rarely waned, we learned several lessons concerning personnel and training. First, there is no substitute for experience, and very few people have experience with stabilization operations. We hired 'experts' with exhaustive resumes who proved incapable of operating without whatever support infrastructure they had enjoyed elsewhere. In some cases, our team members—civilian and military—could not exercise the flexibility necessary to pivot operations as dictated by developing circumstances. It is telling that about one quarter of our team did not complete their tour in Iraq. Those who succeeded shared a commitment to our mission. They also exhibited the ability to work effectively with a diverse and wide range of colleagues and interlocutors under tremendously stressful conditions. Interpersonal skills were among the most valuable assets of our team members and building a cohesive unit was a constant challenge.

Ideally, civilians would train closely with the military units with whom they work. In reality, that is rarely possible. As a result, close communication is necessary to overcome gaps in expectations and experience. Training for civilians should focus on operational issues. Our greatest asset was in knowing how to access civilian resources to address needs and issues we found locally. Those on our team who could pull the bureaucratic levers with our agencies in order to deliver tangible results were the most valuable members of the organization. It seemed that developing close relations with Iraqis and assessing their needs were somewhat less difficult, surprisingly, than getting our own civilian agencies to move quickly.

Lessons for the Future

So, what lessons did we learn and how can they be applied to current and future operations? While some of these are ideals, and others are difficult to implement, taken as a whole they constitute some lessons we should apply to future deployments.

Team Building counts—While it might benefit unit cohesion for PRTs and brigades to calibrate their tours, the most important goal is to build a unified approach. We did that in North Babil by sharing ideas, keeping communications up and down open, and focusing on professional and team development. When I was tasked by the Embassy with providing a quarterly assessment of progress in our area, I included the entire team and the brigade's leadership in the process, soliciting their views and incorporating their ideas. When we established work plans and priorities, the results reflected the consensus of good ideas generated by our team. Because about half our members were uniformed military, we were well integrated into the brigade.

Think Long-Term, but Act Today—This seems obvious, but despite the crushing, immediate demands, civilian leaders should always think about the intermediate and long-term impact of their actions. However, because the window for facilitating change is small and elusive, we must act today to begin change. When we have the opportunity to initiate a project that will improve a community, we must act quickly and intelligently.

Communication—Living on a FOB, there is no reason or way to avoid communicating constantly with our military counterparts. Likewise, talking to local officials and community leaders is the surest way to build relationships and trust. Making others look good—whether that means a battalion commander or a local school principal—is the best way to assure the mission will be a success.

Hire Local Employees—In Babil, we were hamstrung because the EPRT did not employ Iraqis knowledgeable about the local area. In retrospect, I should have hired local Iraqi engineers, bureaucrats or community organizers to help us plan and execute projects, but more importantly to provide deeper context about our civilian Iraqi partners.

Use USAID contractors—USAID typically hires contractors with tremendous expertise who enjoy a much greater ability to move on the battlefield. One tactic we used was to employ those USAID contractors extensively to provide assessments and execute projects. I was surprised to learn that my counterparts at PRTs elsewhere frequently did not even know the contractors existed. In most cases, USAID contractors have more experience on the ground than anyone in the brigade or PRT; that was certainly the case with RTI, the primary contractor for USAID's Local Government Program. Likewise, the Iraqi and third country nationals working under

USAID's Community Stabilization Program was able to quickly deploy resources to communities to rebuild schools, roads and clinics. They also engaged local leaders and populations to generate support for their programs. Coupled with the SOI program, the work of these contractors was the most important factor in our ability to restore normalcy to North Babil.

Engage Local Officials and Community Leaders—In north Babil, there were several unfortunate legacy projects that illustrated the importance of coordinating with local leaders and officials. In several instances, the USG had constructed beautiful facilities—a school and a clinic—without engaging sufficiently with the appropriate government officials. As a result, the ministry refused to assign staff or budget for operations and, more than a year after construction was completed, the facilities were used as storage or offices. In most cases, local officials know how to deal with their own bureaucracies to coordinate projects and avoid building the wrong facility in the wrong place.

Give Them All the Credit—Frequently, local leaders are very timid about building open relationships with US leaders largely for fear of alienating their populations. The best remedy is to provide tangible inducements demonstrating the value of working with the US. In many cases, US military and civilians can provide resources that solve long-standing problems. When we restore electricity or water to a neighborhood, for example, those local leaders who can claim credit for that improvement will instantly become our friends. Amazingly, those who seemed never to have time for us would eagerly seek our help after we demonstrated the ability to improve the lives of their constituents and enabled them to claim credit for the improvements.

Enjoy the Experience—Though difficult, for most civilians the experience of peacekeeping and stabilization operations are exhilarating, interesting and fun.

Howard Van Vranken is a career U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Officer who served as Team Leader of the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in North Babil, Iraq, January, 2008 - January, 2009. Currently the recipient of a Una Chapman Cox Fellowship, Mr. Van Vranken will shortly complete an academic year at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He will return to Iraq with the Department of State following a year of Farsi language training.

COL Rickey Rife, Defense is From Mars, State is from Venus - Improving Communications and Promoting National Security, US Army War College, 1998

Louis XIV and Afghanistan

Foreign Affairs March/April 2010 has an article, "From the Sun King to Karzai," which compares the consolidation of power under Louis XIV (1643 - 1715) as the model that might be used by Afghanistan's President Karzai.  The article contends that France was essentially a collection of loosely affiliated communities with independent institutions, customs, even languages until Louis XIV brought order and central control.  A series of conflicts against the provincial powers from 1648 to 1653 resulted in battle field victories that while successful were enormously expensive.  Louis XIV continued to consolidate power by co-opting his rivals rather than crushing them.  He bought off key individuals, sold national offices to the highest bidders, and created a system that provided a stake in a national authority to local power brokers.  Louis XIV created a state from disparate interests through power, rewards, and creating a situation where a national identity provided more benefit to those in power than their previous provincial realms.  The creation of a French state required bringing these powerful interests into one location under one authority (Versailles served this purpose during the reign of Louis XIV -- it kept the nobility in one place and in the court and under the control of the king).

The author cites modern critics of Afghanistan and other weak states as having undertones, consciously or not, of ethnic or cultural superiority.  The truth is that the formation of a central, strong state has always been a difficult task in that it involves the breakdown of traditional order and long-standing patterns of authority.   In the case of the land that is called Afghanistan, this traditional order goes back several thousand years.    The secret of making a state involves providing benefits for the elites that result in a centralized control of the national terroritory.  The strategic approach in Afghanistan is not in creating a liberal democracy but in finding a way to wield the fragments into a stronger whole. 

I'm not sure if anyone knows how to do that.  The central "whole" for the Taliban is spiritual.  It appears much more difficult in a physical world to find the benefits of staying together.  If the economy could grow and incomes increase to the point where consitutents of local leaders demanded a cohesive whole, then there might be a chance. 

For a history of Afghanistan, see Graveyard of Empires.

It's Complicated ...

One of the standard responses to any question during our Foreign Affairs Counter-insurgency Training in Washington DC prior to coming to Iraq, was -- "It's complicated." I've been in Iraq since February 2008 and the complexity of the society, the issues that trigger conflict, and how we work with the Iraqis to help them find their own way is still a huge issue. I'm sure the situation is the same Afghanistan, and in any tribal society. The graphic below is something I put together from a couple of maps of tribes and paramount sheiks nationally and in one region of Iraq.

My Experience in Iraq

I was recently asked to summarize "best practices" from my experience in Iraq as a USAID Representative on an Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team. The following are the four points that I believe are key in developing an effective counterinsurgency economic development program. These points were first made in a presentation I gave to General David Petraeus in July 2008 at Forward Operating Base Kalsu.

Bring Our Partners Into the Fight - This entails understanding the array (USAID (US Agency for International Development), QRF (Quick Response Funding), CERP (Commander Emergency Response Program), Other Donor, etc.) of economic development programs that are available, determining how the programs "work" and what are the rules to partner with them, and figuring out who makes decisions on investments and then get those people out to the field (this is where you have to make sure the military understands that air support to get the right people out is the best investment they can make in economic development COIN).

Leverage Development Resources for Greater Impact - The objective is to have our partners "own" their part of the fight. Mandating investments from other economic development programs does not work. You have to engage them, understand what their objectives are, and then give them a framework where they can achieve their objectives while supporting your COIN objectives. I found that a lot of the programming decisions being made were based more on relationships than on a strategic planning framework. People want to help, you have to show them how they can, and in a way that fits their program. You have to always look for synergy - win/win scenarios - and you have to champion the ideas when you find them. You can't wait for the partners to show up -- you have to create a concept, market it to the partners, get them out to look at specific parts of what you want to do, and then have them come up with a shared concept in the field - a way forward that everyone is bought in. I have a case study for what we did with aquaculture in North Babil that I could share. Al Qaeda of Mesopotamia had destroyed the industry, occupied fish farms, and shut down most of the production. The US military went in and cleared them out and we went in with an economic development program that involved everyone of our partners and funding from across the spectrum (USAID, QRF, CERP, etc.). The end result was the revitalization of an industry that will produce by 2010 up to 130,000 metric tons of fish and increase gross revenue to farmers and merchants by at least $30 million.

Focus on Iraqi Buy-in & Ownership - Getting local ownership is key to a sustainable efffort. My experience was you were only really able to meet consistently with the local leaders. It was harder to talk with ordinary people. It could happen but it was the exception not the rule. You had to count on them to bring their people (tribe or community) into the discussion, It was very difficult to get local buy-in with the "grant them everything" mentality that comes with COIN but we sought Iraqi leadership of any program we funded. Whether it was a "radio in a box" station in Seddah City or a $2 million Central Euphrates Farmers' Market, you tried to structure the program where they (the Iraqis) were seen by the community as the leaders -- that way, if the program failed, the local leaders lost face but if it succeeded, they appeared more legitimate in the eyes of the community. We wanted the local leaders to have an incentive to make sure the program worked. We tried to build that into everything -- for example, a $200,000 backpack program being handed out by the local councils rather than being given out by the Civil Affairs Units (they could monitor the overall program but it was a locally managed event). This kind of effort takes a lot of work on the ground by the Provincial Reconstruction Team but it has a better chance of being sustained and it helped legitimize local authority. It is also our eventual exit strategy -- at the end of the day, the Iraqis have to assume full ownerhip of their own development efforts.

Use Military as Force Multiplier for Development Programs - Like everything on a Provincial Reconstruction Team, the effectiveness of working with the military came down to personal relationships. The key was to find the company commanders and their Civil Affairs teams that wanted to do something. When I first arrived at the Brigade, I set up a briefing schedule of the battalion senior staff, the civil affairs teams, and, specialized groups, like the Brigade surgeon and the medical team. I explained all the USAID programs, told them how QRF worked, and put out some ideas on how we work together to leverage impact. I told them that I saw my job as helping them restore hope in the communities that were stabilized through economic development programs, employment programs, or whatever their interaction with the community indicated was the highest priority. I then invited anyone to come see me with their idea for an activity. I put a list of already approved Iraqi Rapid Assistance Projects (IRAP) projects on the wall of my office to show as examples of what could be done. We were able to get some really good ideas for activities from Company commanders and their CA teams. Basically, I was not designing and implementing a program that was coordinated with the Brigade, I was there to help them achieve their stabilization and COIN objectives by putting quick disbursing economic and employment generation programs in place where it was important to the overall mission. The goal was to reduce the violence within the communities and against our soldiers by restoring hope.

The Great Arab Conquests

“The Great Arab Conquests:
How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In”
Hugh Kennedy, 2007, Da Capo Press, Philadelphia PA

Arab conquests during the period 630 AD to 750 AD resulted in their control a large part of the known world. In 712 AD at the battle of Poitiers, the Arabs reached the gates of Paris before being driven back. This remarkable series of victories were accomplished with relatively small armies (none was larger than 30,000 men) who rode bareback and were lightly armored. They depended upon spear, sword and shield, the element of surprise, and the weakened conditions of the nations they faced. The Arab conquests were quick and world ranging like those of Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan. The difference was in how the Arab conquests were “made permanent.” Only two countries ever came back to their previous identify after Arab conquest: Spain and Portugal. This book attempts to understand this subject by addressing two questions: (1) how did the conquests take place; and (2) how were the conquered areas settled by a relatively small number of Arabs and become transformed into “Arab” states.

The author discusses the origin of a unified Arab state under the Prophet Mohammed to describe the development of a conquest strategy based primarily on the Koran but also on the Bedouin and Arab urban culture with its tribal relationships and social systems that valued military might and cohesiveness of the tribal group. The key aspect of Islam that transformed the tribes of Arabia into a potent military and governance forces was the creation of a “brotherhood” of Muslims under Islam. Any person who professed a belief in Allah become a brother regardless of ethnicity, race or nationality. This brotherhood was known as “umma” or the Muslim community. Tribal conflict and in-fighting was overcome with this new brotherhood.

Islam also provided the basic strategic framework for all the conquests. Upon the death of Mohammed, the different tribes of Arabia began to assert their independence. A series of wars, the “ridda” wars, brought all the tribes under Muslim control led by the Quraysh tribe of Mecca allied with Bedouin. 1 According to Kennedy, these wars led directly to the expansion of Arabia since the umma formed by Islam would not allow “brother” to attack “brother.” The unified Arabian tribes under Islam had to take their traditional raiding way of life outside Arabia to neighboring countries. The Koran also sanctioned this in verse 9:5: “When the sacred months are past, kill the idolators wherever you find them, seize them, besiege them, lie in wait for them in every place of ambush; but if they repent, pray regularly and give the alms tax, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and merciful.” This was considered the scriptural mandate for conquests.

As Muslim armies were dispatched to conquering neighboring states, more and more Bedouin arrived in Mecca to join the armies to share in spiritual and worldly rewards of conquest. The Arab armies were relatively small. Syria was conquered by an army of less than 30,000 men, while Iraq was won with only 6,000 to 12,000 men. At the crucial battles of Yarmuk in Syria against Roman forces and Qadisiya in Iraq against the Persians (Sasanians). The apparent advantages of the Muslim armies was mobility (they traveled light and lived off the land), good leadership, and strong motivation (for spoils of war but also spiritual – as witnessed in a Muslim speech to Persian authorities prior to battle, “… now we have come to you by order of our Lord, fighting for his sake … we act upon his orders and seek fulfillment of his promise.”). The author makes a strong case that internal strife and ongoing conflicts between the Byzantine Empire and Persia weakened both empires and allowed Muslim armies an opportunity to attack them.2

In explaining how Muslim rulers governed the conquered lands, the author describes the administrative arrangements made that allowed Muslims to maintain their cultural identity and through Islam convert the local population to a common religious belief as well as language. Apparently key cities were chosen for settlement by Muslims and from these cities an administrative system was established to collect tribute owed by non-Muslims. Incentives were created to convert to Islam but there is no major evidence of forced conversion. The systems put in place were effective in that only Spain and Portugal are the only two countries to revert back to Christianity after Muslim rule.

1) Ridda refers to apostasy and originated in the changing beliefs after Mohammend’s death. At least two other prophets arose in Arabia: (1) Maslama of the Banu Hanifa of Yamama in Eastern Arabia; and (2) Sajah, a prophetess of tribes in north-east Arabia.

2) Byzantine Christian doctrine was different than those of many Christians in Syria (Diophysites vs Monophysites) and there was persecution of the local Christians. Muslim arrival at this critical time found a weakened empire. Bubonic plague was also a serious problem for the city dwelling Syrian population – a disease passed by fleas on rats was more of a problem in the cities than with the Bedouin warriors and their mobile camps (not room or place for rats).

Extend of Muslim Conquests – 750 AD

Leviathan - A Hobbesian View of the World

An article in Parameters, Winter 2006-07, pp. 4-13, entitled "The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Perservation Concerning Human Behavior during an Insurgency" posits that gaining control over the population and providing for its security is a key first step in winning an insurgency. Using Thomas Hobbes' classic, Leviathan, the article points out that an individual initially seeks membership in the society for security. Only after the need for security is met does a person pursue a more complete life. This gets complicated in that man's perception of his security is a determining factor of whether he joins an insurgency or not.

English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, wrote Leviathan in 1651 regarding human nature and the foundation of states based on social contract theories. Hobbes describes the need for a strong central authority to prevent social unrest and civil strife because the common nature of man presents a situation in which each person fights for his or her own existence. Preventing chaos caused by man's inherent nature to seek his own will without limit and the situation that arises from that nature -- an unending conflict of "war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes) -- is a primary motivating force for man to accept a form of social contract and establish civil society. According to Hobbes, society is a population beneath a central authority to whom all individuals give up their natural rights for the sake of protection. Submission to this authority is accepted as the price of peace however excessive abuse of power can lead to civil war.

The Hobbesian view of the world, that security of the individual is the primary motivation to the acceptance of authority, is contrary to Aristole's contention that man is by nature a social animal. While social needs may play a part in the formation of society, Hobbes believes the overwhelming need is for security -- everything else, social interaction, economic development, justice, spiritual fulfillment, etc. follows. Failure to secure the population dooms any counter-insurgency effort.

"The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behavor during an Insurgency" tries to answer the question of why some people join an insurgency and others don't. The key is the perception of the population as to who is in control. Most people will choose to be impartial as the struggle between government and insurgency fight for control but the overriding factor determining their eventual loyalty is Hobbesian self preservation. Perceived loss of control of an area by the central government is sufficient for the population to be passive in the face of the insurgency and for a portion of the population to join the insurgency. The majority of the population is waiting to see which form of society will prevail in order to enter new social contracts that ensure their survival.

This approach reinforces a key tenant of General David Petraeus's counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan that the population must be protected at all costs.

The Accidental Guerrilla

The Accidental Guerrilla
Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One
David Kilcullen

This book focuses on the need to continually assess who the enemy is, how conflicts change over time, and how the pursuit of terrorists takes us into the traditional territory of relatively non-radical elements of the society we are fighting in. These local societies feel the intrusion of foreign force and respond not so much for ideological or spiritual reasons but because we are there. Kilcullen contends that warfare is changing and that the environment is set not by the superpower approach to conventional war but by the local actors in one of four scenarios:

(1) Backlash Against Gobalization - The West dominates the process and creates the impression of Western imperialism as local customs, culture and society is impacted by the West.

(2) Globalized Insurgency – There is a transnational globalized insurgency led by takfiri extremists like Al Qaeda which uses provocation, intimidation, protraction, and exhaustion as the tools to intimidate, co-opt, or mobilize its base, the 1.2 billion Sunni Muslims around the world.

(3) A Civil War within Islam – An internal conflict in Islam led by the takfiri radical movement against the Muslim status quo can spill over into a larger conflict with the West.

(4) Asymmetric Warfare – Given the size of US military any rational enemy is likely to fight the US using non-conventional means.

The threat environment is a combination of these scenarios and that different actors are involved for different reasons. US overwhelming military power will result in non-conventional war and it is critical that we understand the reasons and who our enemies are, and what type of response is most appropriate.

The secret to fighting wars in the 21st century according to Kilcullen is understanding that we are not involved in a global war on terror but rather against a relatively small group of takfiri terrorists. The way we fight against them is not with conventional war fighting as defined by the Powell Doctrine (absolute military overkill). When the US tries to respond with overwhelming force we create the conditions that actually spawn a larger guerrilla war. The US reaction to takfiri terrorists causes the local population to react negatively and side with Al Qaeda (see graphic).


Kilcullen covers other topics in the book. He compares Iraq and Afghanistan which are entirely wars and puts forward a template for how to proceed while acknowledging that every conflict from the local to regional to national is different. One of my favorite quotes from the book is from Col. H.R. McMaster – “If you ever think you have the solution to this, you are wrong and you are dangerous…” There are precepts but no models, scenarios but no ironclad outcomes, the fight in the 21st century is complicated and requires a re-thinking by our military leaders of how we fight.